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Abstract
In the general debate prior to the onset of war in Iraq, we made public our view, in a letter
to the Guardian newspaper, that the war could be justiﬁed neither by reference to earlier UN
SecurityCouncil resolutions nor byway of the doctrine of self-defence. In this articlewe reﬂect
on some of the anxieties we experienced both before and after that ‘intervention’ in terms of
the vision of international law we might unwillingly promote, and in terms of the role we
appeared to assume for ourselves, and our professional colleagues, in public debate. Despite
our efforts to prevent legal issues fromdominating,we came tobe viewed as thedefenders of an
anti-hegemonic legality – resisting the erosion by an opportunistic coalition of the principles
of sovereignty, non-intervention, and collective security.Wewere concerned that thismade us
appearchampionsof international lawinawaywithwhichnoneofuswasentirelycomfortable.
On the other hand, in contesting that, we seemed in danger of valorising a politics of expertise
that gave international lawyers a privileged position within the debate. We reﬂect, then, on
the consequences, intentional or otherwise, of our intervention, and explore the dilemmas
associated with it. The problem with which we ﬁnally grapple is whether the relationship
betweencritical scholarship and the techniques associatedwith it (anti-formalism, complexity,
and indeterminacy) is such as to preclude strategic intervention in the effort to stop a war.
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This is a story about a letter by a group of legal scholars to the British PrimeMinister
Tony Blair and the Guardian newspaper, written in March 2003. It is about what
happens when people who teach international law confront impending war, and
about the questions that are brought into focus at such a time. What is the public
role of a teacher of international law? Canwar be resisted through legal argument?
How does an anti-war intervention in the media relate to academic debates about
international law? How does activism relate to critique?
By mid-February 2003 a second war on Iraq was becoming increasingly likely.
In the United Kingdom, debate about whether or not to go to war was being con-
ducted primarily at two levels: prudential (or strategic) and ethical. The media was
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awash with bishops condemning the proposed intervention on religious grounds,
strategists explaining hownecessary it was, political theorists reinventing ‘just war’
doctrine insupportofBlairandUSPresidentGeorgeW.Bush,andop-edwriterswarn-
ing of the Armageddon to come.Meanwhile, the British public was on themarch. A
million people demonstrated in central London on 15 February. Opposition to the
war was becoming a major political issue for the government, with dissent from
both outside and within. In the midst of such mobilization, criticism quickly gave
way to strategizing. Alongside the prudential and ethical debates, a legal debatewas
beginning to emerge, and it suddenly seemed important and urgent for those with
specialist knowledge in the ﬁeld to intervene. A letter to a national newspaper was
an obvious way of doing so.
The idea for our letter arose froma series of conversations among friends. Thepro-
posed text was then circulated, negotiated, and ﬁnalized by e-mail. It was published
on 7March 2003, with 16 signatories. This is what we wrote:
We are teachers of international law.On the basis of the information publicly available
there is no justiﬁcation under international law for the use of military force against
Iraq. The United Nations Charter outlaws the use of force with only two exceptions:
individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed attack and action author-
ized by the Security Council as a collective response to a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace or act of aggression. There are currently no grounds for a claim to use such
force in self-defence. The doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence against an attack that
might arise at some hypothetical future time has no basis in international law. Neither
Security Council resolution 1441 nor any prior resolution authorizes the proposed use
of force in the present circumstances.
Before military action can lawfully be undertaken against Iraq, the Security Council
must have indicated its clearly expressed assent. It has not yet done so. A vetoed
resolution could provide no such assent. The PrimeMinister’s assertion that in certain
circumstances a veto becomes ‘unreasonable’ and may be disregarded has no basis
in international law. The United Kingdom has used its Security Council veto on 32
occasions since 1945. Any attempt to disregard these votes on the ground that they
were ‘unreasonable’ would have been deplored as an unacceptable infringement of the
UK’s right to exercise a veto under United Nations Charter article 27.
A decision to undertake military action in Iraq without proper Security Council au-
thorization will seriously undermine the international rule of law. Of course, even
with that authorization, serious questions would remain. A lawful war is not neces-
sarily a just, prudent or humanitarian war.
Professor Ulf Bernitz, Dr Nicolas Espejo-Yaksic, Agnes Hurwitz, Professor Vaughan
Lowe, Dr Ben Saul, Dr Katja Ziegler, University of Oxford
Professor James Crawford, Dr SusanMarks, Dr Roger O’Keefe, University of Cambridge
Professor Christine Chinkin, Dr Gerry Simpson, Deborah Cass, London School of
Economics
DrMatthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies
Professor Philippe Sands, RalphWilde, University College London
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, University of Paris1
1. Guardian, 7 March 2003.
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1.
Underlying the letter was a range of diverse (and not always mutually consist-
ent) preoccupations and concerns. From one perspective, what was distressing
above all was the prospect of international law being ﬂouted. Without clear Se-
curity Council authorization, there could be no plausible legal justiﬁcation for
going to war. From another perspective, the disturbing development was, on
the contrary, that the necessity of a ‘second’ Security Council resolution had be-
come too much of a ﬁxation in public debates. Why should a single resolu-
tion of that institution make all the difference? And if it does, should that not
rather invite critical scrutiny of international law? From yet another perspect-
ive, provocation came from the way in which international law had become
entangled in New Labour spin. The government had consistently stated its in-
tention to act within the bounds of international law. But the public was
not getting the full story: the assurances that ministers and other senior govern-
ment ofﬁcials were offering as to the legal rectitude of any eventual military action
were far too glib. From a further perspective, the point was simply to contribute to
efforts to stop the war in whatever way one could. Here, the government’s media
manipulation was actually rather welcome. Assurances yielded valuable rhetorical
mileage, inasmuch as they could be used as the basis of a demand that the gov-
ernment adhere to its own professed commitment to comply with international
law.
Among those who signed the letter, by no means everyone identiﬁed with all of
these perspectives. But all identiﬁed with at least one (and, more commonly, more
than one). Most importantly, all shared the sense that this was a moment when a
teacher of international law had to speak out.
But speak out in what terms? One consequence of the letter’s multiple author-
ship was a very narrow and constrained analysis. A number of the more nuanced
legal debates were elided; the wider institutional and legal critique fell away; and
reference to problems under international humanitarian law disappeared. Thus,
we simply stated that the war would be illegal because there had been no Security
Council resolution authorizing it, and because the coalition could not justify such
an intervention under even relatively broad notions of self-defence. Of some con-
troversy was the addition of the ﬁnal sentence to the effect that even a lawful war
would not necessarily be a ‘prudent, just or humanitarian’ one. For the proponents,
the inclusion of such a clause seemed especially signiﬁcant. Among other things,
it offered an exit route for criticism of the war project in the event of a ‘second’
Security Council resolution being adopted. It also demonstrated that we were alert
to the wider world of ethics and politics (though clearly it did so in a somewhat
ambiguous fashion, to the extent that our formulation appeared to presume – and
hence conﬁrm – that the lawyer’s ‘normal’ posture is detachment from that world).
Once the text of the letter was ﬁnalized, it was circulated for signature. The cir-
culation list was largely limited to thosewithin the letter-drafters’ own institutions,
or at any rate, their own cities.Withwar by this point imminent, and crucial parlia-
mentary debates likely to be held the following week, wider participation was not
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sought; speedy publication seemed more important than a long list of signatories.
The letter was sent initially to The Times, which declined to publish it, and then to
the Guardian, which was interested. Faxed to 10 Downing Street, the letter could
nowbe thebasis of a front-page story about international lawyerswarning thePrime
Minister that there was ‘no case for war’. The story ran, and the letter appeared in
the paper’s letters page, on 7March 2003.
So we had made our intervention. We had defended international law against
those who would degrade it. We had reasserted the centrality of the prohibition on
theuseof force in international relationswithin thecontemporary legal order.What
we had not done, however, was to give expression to our critical voice, our sceptical
sensibility.Howwasit thatwewerenowinternational law’searnestchampions? Had
notsomeofusbasedourworkontheeffort toknockinternational lawoff itspedestal,
and expose its darker dimensions? Had we not routinely criticized sovereignty as
purely formal, frequently oppressive, and lacking explanatory power? Yet here we
found ourselves invoking international law, andwith it state sovereignty, in defence
of Iraq. More than that, we found ourselves replicating in the process the same
Manichean structure of argument we sought to challenge. They had hegemony; we
had sovereignty. They had the axis of evil; we had the sovereign equality of states.
They had politics; we had law. But then,with key ﬁgures in theUS administration so
apparently cynical about international law, andwith their supporters in Britain and
elsewhere so focused on spin, didn’t law really need championing? Surely this was
a moment when loyalists were required, not critics. We couldn’t let Bush and Blair
speak the language of a corrupted legalism to us. It was time to reclaim the public
space for serious international legal argument by serious international lawyers.
But what would that ultimately mean? Could we seize the legal ground without
simultaneously being imprisonedwithin it? Howwere we to understandwhat was
going on? Was this a case of critical sensibilities dulled by political thrill-seeking?
A temporary and strategic embrace of the doctrinal? Or legalism’s united front
threatening to dissolve in self-doubt?
2.
In the period after 7March, the British government began to get increasingly defens-
ive about the consistency of the proposed war with international law. On 17March
the UK Attorney General (chief government law ofﬁcer) took the unusual step of
issuing a public statement (in the form of a written parliamentary answer) setting
out a legal justiﬁcation for the war.2 The statement was based on a more detailed
document thatwas itself, as is usually the case, kept conﬁdential. Thiswas big news,
and for a time the question of legality was in the foreground of the war debate.
The statement was reportedly used by the government whips in an attempt to win
round uncertainmembers of parliament in a House of Commons vote on thewar. It
was also cited by outspoken cabinet member Clare Short as one of the factors that
2. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 41, Part 364, Cols. 515W–516W, 17March 2003.
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persuaded her to staywith the government at that time. (Short later resigned, citing
concerns about the plans for postwar reconstruction and the apparent sidelining of
the United Nations.)
Among the signatories to the letter, the question of whether a ‘response’ to the
Attorney General’s statement should be made was raised. Three of the group met
and prepared a draft, rebutting the points made in the statement. At this point,
then, we contemplated expanding our involvement from a one-off intervention to
somethingmore sustained. Our rebuttalwould turn the process into a conventional
adversarial debate, in this case between academics and politicians: our letter – the
Attorney General’s statement – our response.
As one would expect, the reaction from the group as a whole was mixed. Just
as people had different, sometimes mutually contradictory, reasons for signing the
original letter, so that views on themerits of a second letter seem to reﬂect contrast-
ing positions about international law and the role of the legal academic in public
discourse. Those united in their reluctance, for example, were divided in their un-
derlying reasons for adopting this view. For some, there was no point entering into
the debate; our point had been made. Whether to intervene depended on whether
anything thathadbeensaidoriginallyneededclariﬁcationorelaboration.Forothers,
the very notion of having made an intervention had been troubling from the start,
and with the debate now becoming relatively complex, we risked becoming even
more embroiled in a process of argumentation about which we remained doubtful.
Moreover, insofar as the recourse to formalism had somehow been conscionable
when war was being contemplated (on the basis that it might somehow contribute
to efforts to stop the war), now that war was inevitable such a strategic reason fell
away. Context was key, and the moment had passed.
We decided not to proceed with a collective response. Like the original decision
to write a letter (and, perhaps, because of it) this decision was itself a form of
intervention. Having placed ourselves as participants in the debate, our silence now
resonated andbecame something aboutwhich to speculate.Wewere askedwhether
we had been won round by the arguments of the statement. One correspondent,
assuming this had in fact been the case, commented bitterly that ‘Short’s syndrome’
seemed to be infectious.
Ifwewere reluctant towriteagain,our initial impulse to letter-writingwasclearly
shared by some of our colleagues. On the heels of the Attorney-General’s statement
came a letter to The Times from Professors Philip Allott and Alan Dashwood at
Cambridge, who wrote that
the present imbroglio in the Security Council is liable to lead some people to conclude
that theUN is now irrelevant. This risk has been increased bywhat some international
lawyers who should know better are saying about the UN Charter rules on the use
of force . . . Responsible international lawyers should see it as their task, not to rush
to simplistic and out-dated judgements, but to do all they can to make a new and
very dangerous international reality conform to the precious spirit and purpose of the
Charter system.3
3. The Times, 19 March 2003, Features, 23.
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Whereas this letter’s message about international law was somewhat difﬁcult
to grasp (was this a defence of the planned action in Iraq? or was the concern
merely that we had been insufﬁciently sophisticated?), its condescending view of
those lawyers who took a contrary position was plain. And if the opaque nature
of the substantive message might lead one to uncertainty about which individuals
were the target of criticism, the conclusion that it was those setting out the anti-
war case, including the Guardian letter signatories, was inescapable. The chiding
remarks called into question both expertise (‘should know better . . . simplistic and
out-dated judgements’) and integrity (referring to the ‘task’ of ‘responsible inter-
national lawyers’). As well as addressing the general lay audience and invoking
professional expertise as we (‘teachers of international law’) had done, the letter
also pursued a certain form of academic critique aimed at professional colleagues.
In this letter and others like it, we were accused of a naive textualism in relation
to the Charter. We had failed to see how much the world had changed since 1945,
1989, or perhaps 2001. Good lawyers interpreted the Charter instrumentally and
purposively; we had embraced a dullard’s literalism. This controversy resembled, of
course, virtually every debate anyone had ever had about the use of force under the
Charter. The sense of de´ja` vuwas overwhelming – the temptation to fall into nostal-
gic reminiscences about previous doctrinal battles over Entebbe (whatwas ‘political
independence’ anyway?) or Panama (a right to pro-democratic intervention?) was
easily resisted, but it was hardly cheering to realize that instead of having transcen-
ded the debate we were embroiled in it . . . and as ‘positivists’.
Things were becoming more complicated. Initially, the identity of the parti-
cipants, the association with particular positions, and the location of the interven-
tions were to be contrasted in a binary fashion: academics writing in newspapers,
government politicians issuing ofﬁcial statements. Now academics were arguing
among themselves, and in the same medium. Moreover, the impulse to participate
spread outside the narrow, and relatively formal,mediumof newspaper correspond-
ence to the news media more generally, as various international lawyers, including
some of the Guardian signatories, gave interviews and took part in television and
radio debates.
Although we were now placed in the same position as everyone else engaged
in the public anti-war debate – politicians, activists, and so on – in espousing a
particular view within a broader expert community, our professional expertise led
us to be treated as a special case. Lawyers, of course, are not only popularly presented
as the guardians of a set of rules unknowable to the lay person – an idea on which
our claim to have something worth reading about had been based – we are also
oftenpresentedasopportunists capableofholdingdifferent,mutually contradictory
positions depending on the strategic needs of the time. Invocations of the old cliche´
about asking several lawyers the same question and getting different answers from
each accompanied the shift in the public presentation of the question of law and
the war from ‘lawyers claimwar is unlawful’ to ‘lawyers disagree about war against
Iraq’.
Such challenges seemed to require thatwe embrace formalism evenmore tightly.
By setting out a legal case, our original intervention had presupposed the validity
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of law’s claim to determinacy; now we had to argue that a multiplicity of expert
views on the subject did not reﬂect international law’s ability to mean all things to
all people. The lawwas clear, and those who disagreed with us were wrong.
At the same time,however, just as indeterminacyassailedus fromtheoutside, am-
bivalence was corroding our certainties from the inside. Like Robert Frost’s liberals,
wewere ﬁnding it difﬁcult to take our own side in an argument. Invited on to panels
to give an anti-war legal view,we repeatedly disappointed ourhosts and the anti-war
sections of the audience who had put their faith in us as exponents of the case for
an anti-hegemonic international law. Understandably enough, we were expected
to maintain and carry forward the legalist challenge, to rebut authoritatively the
Attorney General, and to express our general disquiet at the Bush administration’s
subversion or denigration of international law (noting in passing the US rejection
of the Kyoto Protocol, its repudiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its
resistance to the International Criminal Court). That we did not do so – or at least,
not in the expectedmanner – seemed to leave those listening profoundly perplexed
(had the right person been invited?).
In one such debate, one of us confessed to feelings of ambivalence aboutwhether
in retrospect it had been right to oppose the war (by then under way), only to
be challenged by a member of the audience for ‘seeming awfully sure about his
ambivalence’. Images of mass graves, cheering crowds, and falling statues were
beginning to conﬁrm earlier doubts. But perhaps we had now swapped one form
of certainty for another. In another debate, panellists were invited to provide an
assessment of the ‘damage to international law’ caused by the military action in
Iraq. Questioners wanted to know how the integrity of international law could
be restored. Through what arguments could the Attorney General’s statement be
refuted? Bywhatmeans could legal challenge bemounted against the coalition? In
what fora could Bush andBlair be criminally prosecuted? Whenone of us expressed
misgivings about the implicit vision here of international law as a redemptive force
which could save the world if only it was allowed (or made) to operate properly,
no one wanted to know. Likewise, the idea that, in depicting the war as the work
of evil men who should be punished, the anti-war activists were mimicking the
logic of those they sought to oppose, simply substituting Bush and Blair for Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden, had no resonance. Had we been hoist by our own
petard?
At the same time, andnot surprisingly,wewere accusedof defendinga formalistic
anda-historicalsovereignty. Inapublicmeetingconveneddaysaftertheintervention
began, political scientists derided our legalism, our failure to grasp the changing
worldaroundusandourblindness to thevirtuesof theBlair government’s crusading
humanitarian spirit. There was something touching, but also dangerous, about this
bookish international law of ours. A week or so later, two respected doctrinalists
sloggeditoutbeforeLondon’s ‘greatandgood’.Again, thequestions(bemused,world-
weary, mildly exasperated), and indeed the introductory remarks (‘when lawyers
disagree, they get paid’), signalled that enough had been heard from the lawyers.
All this bickering over vaguely worded ‘law’ was so familiar and so unhelpful. If for
theGuardian letter-writers legal argument had seemed away of avoiding the charge
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of ﬁddling while Rome burns, now legal argument appeared to be exposing those
involved to precisely that charge.
3.
Reﬂecting back on these events, it seems clear that, whatever value our letter may
havehad, italsocarrieddangersandpromptedmany,oftenuncomfortablequestions.
The various responseswe received and our own experiences after publication of the
letter helped to clarify these, even if not to resolve them. Although there are others,
ten issues are worth highlighting.
3.1. Personal gratiﬁcation
The letter’s publicationnodoubt affected its signatories indiverseways. Some spoke
of ribbing by friends, parental pride, and the odd collegial lambasting (‘who do you
think you are?’). Many received congratulatory e-mails and an unwonted number
of calls from the press. So was the letter in the end just about personal gratiﬁcation,
about promoting ourselves in the public domain, displaying expertise, acquiring
a war story? Clearly it was in part about these things, but could we refute the
accusation that this was a self-seeking enterprise by observing that self-promotion
afteralldoesnothavetooperatetotheexclusionofstrategy,andthatourintervention
was both? Or is that self-delusion? Does self-promotion in fact get in the way of
effective action? At any rate, does the kind of self-promotion in which a critical
lawyer might seek to engage – one that combines a desire for visibility with an
identity based onmarginality – get in the way of effective action?
3.2. Expertise
The legal analysis presented in our letter was prefaced by a declaration of our status
as teachers of international law. Were we right to invoke authority in this way?
On the one hand, one might say that people do in fact listen to what lawyers say
about law, just as they would listen to what a palaeontologist says about a fossil.
Eachwithin their own sphere . . . On the other hand, isn’t this precisely an example
of the politics of expertise that we constantly criticize? Aren’t we reinforcing here
the idea that justice is something you know, and furthermore knowledge to which
we have privileged access, as opposed to something that gets deﬁned and redeﬁned
in the crucible of social struggle? Or can we again content ourselves with the
thought that the politics of expertise was being turned here to ‘good’ strategic
ends?
Moreover, precisely whose authority and expertise was being invoked? The let-
ter was signed by academics at three elite universities – Cambridge, London, and
Oxford –using academic titles (Professor, Dr)where applicable. A typical reaction in
an e-mail from one colleague at a ‘new’ (former polytechnic) university in London
thanked us formaking the intervention, but askedwhypeople froma broader range
of institutions were not asked to sign. A question speculating on the reason for
this – ‘do new universities dilute the effect?’ – serves as a reminder that our letter
had not only appeared to assume the validity of a conceptual system that some of us
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usually sought to interrogate; in the choice of signatories it also risked reinforcing
institutional hierarchies within legal academia.
3.3. Formalism
What, then, was the strategy pursued through this letter? What could formalism
achieve? At one level it seemed an obvious rhetorical tool. Since Tony Blair had
promised in Parliament to act at all times consistently with international law, fram-
ing our arguments in terms of holding Blair to his own stated commitments just
seemed to make sense as rhetoric. At the same time, however, there were some
equally obvious dangers.
In the ﬁrst place, a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the war might
have been passed. We tried to reserve our position through the last paragraph of
our letter, in which we stated that even a lawful war was not necessarily just,
prudent, or humanitarian. But that was clearly weak. For those of us who believed
that the military action then proposed was indeed unjust, imprudent, and anti-
humanitarian,was it right to run the risk that our legal argumentsmight ultimately
come to undermine our political goals?
Second, there was the danger of valorizing the currency. Why were we encour-
aging faith in international law as an agent of justice and peace whenwe know that
it helps to legitimate oppression and justify violence, and we devote a considerable
portion of our energies to showing how? One response to this might be that there
is surely not a coherent, uniﬁed currency here. International law also has the po-
tential to help those trying to resist oppression and curb violence. In other words,
it works in more than one dimension, and so therefore must we. Or is this just
rationalization?
Finally, there is the question of the effects of a turn to formalism for ourselves,
our identity and solidarity as critical scholars, and our capacity for solidarity and
co-operative activity with others.Were we talking down to the addressees of our re-
marks, and failing to share with them our insight that international law is not
necessarily the beneﬁcent force they take it to be? Or could we assume they
already had their own grounds for scepticism about international law, and just
wanted to be better informed about how it could be used to help stop the war
in Iraq?
3.4. Anti-formalism
Once the war began, our attention turned to the question of how international law
had been used to justify it.We started to talk about indeterminacy and ambivalence
and ambiguity. We reﬂected on all the various legal arguments that had been ad-
vanced for and against the war and tried to analyze what had made some kinds of
legal argument more popularly compelling than others.
We also tried to theorize what was going on, and to retrieve the political within
the technical: we spoke in critical terms about the lawwhich governs the conduct of
warfare, about theway inwhichconcepts suchasproportionality,militarynecessity,
and distinction, not to mention the very term humanitarian law, belong with the
372 MATTHEW CRAVEN, SUSAN MARKS, GERRY SIMPSON, AND RALPH WILDE
larger processes throughwhichwar gets sanitized and brutality condoned. Later on,
once the war had ended, we also talked about international law’s constitutive role
in relation to the colonization of Iraq, about how the Fourth Geneva Convention
worked in various ways to legitimate the profoundly undemocratic processes of
reconstruction by then under way, and so on.
What was striking, however, was that no one seemed to want to hear this. If we
had been unsure before as to whether people had exaggerated faith in international
law, now it seemed absolutely clear that they did. Were we reaping what we had
sown? Orwere theactivists andotherswithwhomwewerediscussing thesematters
right to keep us focused on international law’s emancipatory potentials?
3.5. Civil disobedience
People who had been charged with criminal damage in connection with efforts to
stop military action then approached us with a request to act as expert witnesses
as to the illegality of the war. Some of us have agreed to this. Should we have done
so? On the one hand, why not? No one is forcing us to choose between making
arguments in terms of international law and opposing the idea that international
law provides answers to the problems we face. On the other hand, and especially
in the light of the experiences just mentioned, were we simply failing to learn our
lesson?
3.6. War crimes
At the same time, the air was thick with talk of criminal proceedings of a very
different sort: trials for crimes against humanity committed by SaddamHussein and
other Iraqi ofﬁcials and trials for war crimes committed by American and British
ofﬁcers and even by the two leaders Bush and Blair.What attitude were we to adopt
to these proposals? In an immediate sense, as noted above, there is an obvious and
disturbing symmetrybetween theactivists’ call to tryBushandBlair and the rhetoric
used to justify the war in the ﬁrst place: in both cases the central idea is that this is
all about the actions of an evil clique, or even a single evil man.
More broadly, there are all the questions that perplex us generally about war
crimes trials: what purpose is served by such trials? Do they just give the accused
an exceptionally strong platform fromwhich to tell his or her self-justifying story?
Do they privatize and individualize responsibility for that which should rather
be seen as public and systemic? By establishing criminal responsibility for some
forms of violence, do they help to sanctify the idea that other forms of violence and
suffering are acceptable, or at any rate unavoidable? In the end, then, shouldwe not
view international criminal justicemuch as some view national criminal justice, as
more amatter of discipline than of justice, more amatter of asserting authority and
monopolizing virtue than protecting people and reducing insecurity? Or are those
seeking punishment right? We might squirm at the activists’ moral certainty and
righteous indignation, but what if that too should be understood in strategic terms?
Could it be that absolutism is the price of effective action?
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3.7. The end of international law?
For every letter to the paper arguing that the war was legal or illegal, there was
another arguing that might makes right: international law is simply irrelevant.
This is, of course, a longstanding theme of both left and right commentary. For
example, Chomksy has consistently argued that for the United States ‘Diplomacy
and international law have always been regarded as an annoying encumbrance.’4
Does the 2003 Iraqwar thenmark the point atwhich aUS administration,with help
from the British, ﬁnallymanaged to shrug off diplomacy (in the shape of the United
Nations) and international law? Or is this just what Richard Perle and others would
like us to think?
Clearly the US and UK governments have in fact been careful to explain their
conduct in international legal terms, andhaveput considerable energy into Security
Council negotiations. Are people like Chomsky falling for an ideology that charac-
terizes the UN and international law as ineffectual, as ameans of ensuring that they
become so? Alternatively, are such people falling for an ideology that characterizes
theUSasdesirousof ensuring that international lawbecomes ineffectual? Given that
power isneversustainedbyforcealone,butalwaysthroughprocessesof legitimation
and co-optation, it seems difﬁcult to imagine a better way of securing hegemonic
power than through a systempremised on the formal equality of states.What, then,
if the dark secret at the heart of the Bush administration is that the leading ﬁgures
within it are international law’s most ardent supporters and patrons?
3.8. Historicity
To those who argue that the 2003 Iraq war (or indeed some earlier event) marks
the point at which international law was ﬁnally shrugged off, history is a series of
tests which international law either passes or (as in this case) fails. From another
perspective, the reverse is the case: international law is itself the test of history.
Quite clearly, both positions are problematic, inasmuch as both forget or at any rate
obscure international law’s own historicity. We need to resist this reifying gesture
and sustain a sense of the character of international law as dynamic and contestable.
Wementioned earlier the risk that a UN Security Council resolution authorizing
the war might have been passed, and asked whether we were right to run this risk.
The real question is perhaps why, instead of making the arguments we did, we did
not invite public reﬂection on the fact that all it would have taken to make the war
legal was Security Council authorization. In fact, as indicated earlier, that was one
of the concerns behind the letter. Some of us were worried about the way the issue
of whether the war was legal was eclipsing the issue of whether the war was a good
idea. We wanted people precisely to consider the possibility that, if all it took was
Security Council authorization tomake thewar legal, perhaps therewas something
wrong with international law. How then are we to understand the process through
which this aspect got lost?
4. N. Chomsky,Deterring Democracy (1992), 3.
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3.9. Crises
In an article on the Kosovo crisis Hilary Charlesworth makes some valuable ob-
servations about the preoccupation which international legal scholars have with
crises.5 Our conferences, discussiongroups, articles, andbooksaremostly concerned
with extraordinary events, outbreaks of violence, international incidents. As Char-
lesworth explains, this promotes attention to so-called high politics or dramatic
accidents, and encourages us to neglect long-term trends and structural problems.
Poverty, lack of access to clean water, excessive military spending, HIV/AIDS, and
violenceagainstwomenareamongtheprincipal crisesofour times, yet these remain
at the margins of our scholarly debates. In intervening as we did in the Iraq ‘crisis’,
were we fuelling this process by which the scandals of everyday life get normalized
and even removed from view? Could we console ourselves with the thought that
we alsowrite about poverty and the rest? Or does this again not work?
3.10. Lessons for critical practice
Crises, then, are problematic, but one thing that this experience brought home to us
is that context counts. The procedures of a critical practice cannot be speciﬁed ab-
stractly or in advance, becausewhat is ideological in one context is not so in another.
So, for example, the arguments made to justify the war were that international law
is indeterminate, that international law on this matter is very complex, and that
international law should not be approached with excessive formality.
Indeterminacy, complexity, and anti-formalism seemrather familiar fromcritical
scholarship, but this is surely a reminder that we cannot regard them as having
some critical essence any more than we can regard their antitheses as having some
ideological essence. As Slavoj Zizek puts it in his work on ideology: ‘When some
procedure is denounced as “ideological par excellence”, one can be sure that its
inversion isno less ideological.’6 Hegoeson to showhowideology canwork through
arguments from both necessity and contingency, both simplicity and complexity,
and so on.
Yet if formalism can be critical too, that does not, of course, make the dangers we
have highlighted go away. Commenting on the danger that, depending on events
in the Security Council, our legal advocacy might end up being turned against our
political goals, some interlocutorswonderedwhether thatwasnot after all the point
of the whole critical enterprise in the ﬁrst place. Maybe. Or does the distinctiveness
of the critical enterprise lie in the fact that it raises these issues, it prompts these
anxieties, but precisely does not resolve them?
5. H. Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, (2002) 65Modern Law Review 377.
6. ‘Introduction’, in S. Zizek (ed.),Mapping Ideology (1994), 1, 4.
